codes, algebraic-geometric codes, information theory.
( ; ) -0T2, i.e., an efficient two-party protocol to achieve ANDOS based on the assumption of the existence of a protocol for the simpler type of oblivious transfer. The fact that the more general ANDOS can be reduced to (?)-OT2 is not surprising because a number of authors 1231, [24] , [30] , [12] , [25] , and [15] , have later shown that (9)-OT2 is sufficient to implement any two-party computation. Nevertheless, our direct reductions are interesting because of their greater efficiency. Even more efficient direct reductions of this kind were subsequently given in [19] . In the remainder of this section, we review the basic intuition behind the reductions presented in 161. Section I1 defines formally the type of functions needed to achieve our goal, which we call zigzag functions, and it gives formal definitions for oblivious transfer based on informationtheoretic considerations. Section I11 reduces the problem of finding efficient zigzags to the notion of self-intersecting codes [8] . Section IV surveys techniques for the construction of efficient self-intersecting codes based on our earlier work in [19] . Finally, Section V discusses open problems together with a new research direction we are currently investigating: an alternative approach based on privacy amplification [4] to the problem considered in this paper and to a natural generalization. The Appendixes contain proofs of the main theorems of this paper.
A. Oblivious String Transfer: The Basic Reduction
For any n-bit string x , let x2 denote the ith bit of x . For a set I = { i l , i 2 , ..., im} such that 1 5 i l < i z < ... < i, 5 n, we define X I to be the concatenation xZ1 x22 . . . xzm . Assume A and B dispose of a safe protocol to accomplish (9)-OT2. Assume instead that we have a function f : ( 0 , l}" + ( 0 , l}k with the property that for every two input strings xo, 2 1 and every disjoint sets I , J C {I, 2 , . . . , n}, seeing 0018-9448/96$05.00 0 1996 IEEE the bits x i and x{ releases information on at most one of f ( s 0 ) or f ( x 1 ) . We could then use the following protocol to achieve (5) -0T;. value 1 when true and 0 when false. For simplicity, from now on we denote w' = WO, w1, ..., wt-1.
Protocol 1.1: (~) -o T~( w~, wl)(c)
1) A picks random 20 , XI E (0, 1)" such that 2) DO A transfers z2 3) B recovers w, by computing f ( z ) .
This protocol works since an honest B gets xi1' . I"' and x!, which gives him full information on w, and no information on we. By the definition of f , on the other hand, a cheating B who gets x i and xf for some I # 0 # 7 cannot get information on both f(x0) and f ( x 1 ) simultaneously.
Based on the above protocol, one of the main purposes of this paper is to discuss efficient solutions to the problem of building such functions f .
) A Simple Example:
Consider the following function f : (0, 1}3 i (0, 1}2 that can be used to accomplish (;)-OTf from (?)-OT2, where @ is used to denote the exclusive-or. If we use this function with the above protocol, we see that if B gets x i , xg, x i at Step 2) he will be able to compute (w;, w,") = f ( x i , xg, xi], and, similarly if he gets x!, IC:, x:. But if he gets x; and x: for some I # 0 # 1, then one of I or 1 (call it Y ) must be such that #Y = 1. Note that the partial functions f ( d , *, *), f ( * , x2, *), and f ( * , *, z3) give all four possible outputs given the four possible inputs. Therefore, given only one bit of IC, nothing is known about the output of f , i.e., the corresponding w.
B. All-or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets
Assume now A and B dispose of a safe protocol to accomplish (9) -0T;. They wish to perform (i) -0T; over the k-bit strings WO, w1, . . . , wt-1. The idea is for A to choose t -2 random k-bit strings 2 1 , x 2 , . . ., xt-2. Using (f)-OTi, A offers B to choose to learn one of WO or x1. Then, she offers him to choose between w1 @ x1 or x2 XI, and then between ~2~3 x 2 or ~3~3 x 2 , and so on. (A special case is made for wt-l--see the formal description of the protocol below.)
If B wants to learn WO, he must do so in the first instance of (P)-OT;, but then all information about 2 1 is lost, which precludes learning anything about the other ~0,'s. If B wants to learn w1 instead, he must obtain x1 in the first instance of (2) -0Ti-thus forsaking all information about wo-and then w1 @ 2 1 in the second instance: this enables him to compute w1 = x1 @ (w1 @ 21) but at the cost of losing all information about 2 2 , and therefore about all subsequent w,'s. We formally prove in Appendix I that Protocols 1.1 and 1.2 accomplish the task they were designed for in a very strong sense defined in Section 11-B.
FORMAL DEFINITIONS
of zigzag functions. This notion is crucial to understanding the connection between oblivious transfer and self-intersecting codes. Section 11-B introduces information-theoretic definitions for correctness and privacy of a protocol for oblivious transfer. We prove in Appendix I that the protocols of Section I are correct and private implementations of their respective version of oblivious transfer.
A. Dejinition of Zigzag Functions
In this section, we first give a formal defi Let F be a finite set.
Dejinition 2.1: Consider function
(1) Intuitively, I biases f if knowledge of the entries xr of an otherwise unknown vector x E F" may give information on 
and is eJjCicient if there exists an efficient algorithm D to find at least one such i for any given k . Moreover, D must produce an efficient algorithm , Ez to compute f, and an efficient algorithm C, to produce random preimages of fi chosen according to the uniform distribution. Thus for any w E F k and II: E Fg('"), II: may be produced from a call on C,(w) only if f,(z) = w , in which case it is produced with probability 2'-g(').
Note that algorithm C, must be probabilistic for this notion to make sense. In all cases, algorithms are considered efficient provided their expected running time is upper-bounded by a polynomial in the value of k . However, the probability of failure must be exponentially small in k.
In the special case of a deterministic zigzag family, for which algorithm 27 is deterministic, there is no reason for i to be different from k and we may as well require that
Our goal is to find efficient g(k)-zigzag families for the smallest possible function g( k ) . Note 
B. Information-Theoretic Dejinition of Oblivious Transfer
A cryptographic protocol is a multiparty synchronous program that describes for each party the computations to be performed or the messages to be sent to some other party at each point in time. The protocol terminates when no party has any message to send or information to compute. The protocols we describe in this paper all take place between two parties A and B. We denote by A and the honest programs to be executed by A and B: honest parties behave according to A and 8 and no other program. In the following definitions of correctness and privacy we also consider alternative dishonest programs d and @ executed by A or 2 3 in an effort to obtain unauthorized information from one another. The definitions specify the result of honest parties interacting together through a specific protocol as well as the possible information leakage of an honest party facing a dishonest party. We are not concerned with the situation where both parties may be dishonest as they can do anything they like in that case; we are only concerned with protecting an honest party against a dishonest party. At the end of each execution of a protocol, each party will issue an "accept" or "reject" verdict regarding their satisfaction with the behavior of the other party. Two honest parties should always issue "accept" verdicts at the end of their interactions. An honest party will issue a "reject" verdict at the end of a protocol if he received some message from the other party of improper format or some message not satisfying certain conditions specified by the protocol. We also implicitly assume certain time limits for each party to issue messages to each other: after a specified amount of time, a party will give up interacting with the other party and issue a "reject" verdict.
As [36] , and Beaver [l] using simulators. In this paper, we use the language of information theory to express definitions similar to those introduced by CrCpeau [14] . Our goal is not to discuss definitions for general two-party protocols: we restrict our study to oblivious transfers. ( b ) be the marginal random variables obtained by restricting the above to only one party P. The latter is often called the view of P [26] . In the following definition, the equality sign (=) means that the distributions on the left-hand side and the right-hand side are the same. The symbol "E" stands for the empty string.
) Correctness

Dejinition 2.4 Correctness
a distribution on B's output using a dishonest d that she could not induce simply by changing the input words and then being honest (which she can always do without being detected). This second condition, called awareness in [36] , is concerned with the future use of the outputs of a protocol. If the output of a protocol is to be used later in another protocol we wish to guarantee that the output distribution of the first protocol corresponds to the expected output distribution prescribed by the task definition. Otherwise, trouble may force a party to abort and thus disclose situational information about past executions of the protocol. Although some authors [36] insist that correctness and privacy must be defined together in the general case, the particular case of oblivious transfers allows for independent definitions. 
I ( @ ; [A, B&(@)(C)IC, W e ) = 0. (7)
The above two conditions are designed to guarantee that each party is limited to the information he or she should get according to the honest task definition. Condition (6) means that A cannot acquire any information about C through the protocol. Condition (7) means that B may acquire information about only one of WO, W1, . . . , Wt-l through the protocol.
In particular, no joint information about the t words may be obtained by the protocol. This is why our condition assumes that is given one of the words. We do not require that B be given WC because there is no way to prevent him from obtaining any other WE through otherwise honest use of the protocol.
One of the main results of this paper is to provide a transformation of any protocol for (?)-OT~ satisfying the above constraints into a protocol for (f)-OT; also satisfying these constraints. Please consult Appendix I for proofs that Protocols 1.1 and 1.2 are correct and private when based on a correct and private (;)-OTa.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. 42, NO 6, NOVEMBER 1996 Nevertheless, few protocols for (9) -0T2 actually satisfy the above constraints perfectly. In general, the above constraints are only satisfied statistically; statistical versions of constraints (4), (6) , and (7) are obtained by replacing the right-hand side zero by an exponentially decreasing function in a security parameter s and by changing the equality (=) in constraint (5) by statistical indistinguishability (for a precise definition of this notion, consult [26] , for instance). Protocols 1.1 a d 1.2 may also be used to transform a protocol for (?)-OTz satisfying statistical correctness and privacy into a protocol for (t) -0T; also satisfying these statistical constraints.
LINEAR ZIGZAGS
In order to generalize the simple example of Section I-A1, we shall look at linear families of functions, i.e., functions The use of linear functions has the advantage that it is efficient to compute them and to compute random preimages of arbitrary points in IF' . Therefore, families of linear functions are eficient in the sense of Definition 2.3 provided they can be constructed efficiently. In other words, there must be an efficient algorithm 2) that produces (the encoding of) a k x g ( k ) matrix over F that defines a ( g ( k ) , k)-zigzag for each integer k . Different matrices may be produced on different calls on D ( k ) if the zigzag family is probabilistic, and it may happen with vanishingly small probability that a call on D ( k ) produces a matrix that does not define a zigzag at all if the family is allowed to be Monte Carlo.
A. Matrix Characterization
Given a IC x n matrix M over field IF and integer i, 
permutation of the elements of IFk e M' has rank k .
B. A Trivial Lower Bound
Since our goal is to determine the smallest function g for which we can find efficient g(k)-zigzag families, we now give a simple lower bound. Proposition 3.2: For any linear g(k)-zigzag family, it must
Proof: For any matrix of size k x n for n < 2k -1,
Note that the bound g ( k ) 2 2k -1 applies for any field IF.
C. Code Characterization
We now introduce a new characterization of the matrices that define zigzag functions in terms of the words of a code generated by the rows of the matrix. For this purpose we need the following definition.
Dejinition [8] have shown that the dual of BCH codes of length n = 2" -1 and design distance 2t + 1 < $2"/' + 3 are intersecting. Retter [40] showed that most (classical) Goppa codes (see [34] ) of rate less than 0.0817 are intersecting.
Define n ( k ) = min{n: there exists a binary [ n , k , d ] intersecting code. Katona and Srivastava [28] [8] and [37] ). These bounds are the following:
These bounds imply that, asymptotically, binary [ck, k , d] intersecting codes exist for c > 4.8188 but not for c < 3.5277.
Nevertheless, no efficient zigzag family can be inferred from the above results because even if most codes satisfy the property, it is not clear how to obtain efficiently one that is guaranteed to satisfy it.
The current section focuses on the polynomial-time constructability of such zigzag families. First we use in Section IV-A the fact proven in Appendix I1 that for a = 1og4/3 4 = 4.8188 and any y > a, a random k x yk binary matrix defines a (yk, k)-zigzag with probability asymptotically close to 1, ' For the remainder of this paper we ormt the word "self' as no other type of intersecting codes are considered. We have considered using pairs of intersecting codes but asymptotlcally we get the same results.
while a random k x Xk binary matrix for any X < a defines a ( A k , k)-zigzag with probability asymptotically close to 0. In both cases, the convergence is exponentially fast in k . (The first part of this result is implied by the proof of Cohen and Lempel [8] of Komlbs' bound.) This yields an obvious @(/?)-time Monte Carlo binary yk-zigzag family for any y > a.
Then, we show that the concatenation of intersecting codes yields an intersecting code, and we use this fact in three constructions. Section IV-C applies this technique to the Monte Carlo family derived in Section IV-A to improve it to a 0(k2)-time Las Vegas binary 2yk-zigzag family for any y > a. Section IV-D presents an "efficient" O(k3')-time deterministic binary 0(k)-zigzag family based on the algebraic-geometric codes of Goppa [27] . Finally, Section IV-E uses the concatenation method in a construction reminiscent of that of Justesen codes to obtain an O(k4)-time deterministic binary O(k)-zigzag family.
A. Monte Carlo Construction
In this section, we determine precisely the size of random matrices over IF2 that define binary linear zigzags. If k denotes the number of rows, then there is a threshold function t ( k ) , which is linear in k , such that a random binary matrix with more than t ( k ) columns defines a linear zigzag with high probability, whereas a random binary matrix with less than t ( k ) columns does not define a linear zigzag, also with high probability. The proof of this theorem may be found in Appendix 11. Although the first part of this result is implied by the proof of Cohen and Lempel [8] of Koml6s' bound, we nevertheless include it in our proof since it is only one line.
Remark: A similar analysis for the case of matrices over I F, shows that for any E > 0, a random I F, matrix of size
has asymptotic probability 1 of being a zigzag, as q + 00. This is optimal according to Proposition 3.2.
Time Complexity: As mentioned before, Proposition 1) yields an efficient Monte Carlo binary yk-zigzag family for any y > a. The 
running time of this construction is O ( k 2 ) .
On the other hand, Proposition 2) shows that this bound is optimal in the sense that this technique cannot yield a binary Xk-zigzag family for any X < Q.
B. Intersecting Concatenated Codes
In the remainder of this section, we consider several constructions of intersecting codes based on concatenation [22] and [34] . We need the following Lemma, first used implicitly in [19] CO and c1 of the concatenated code 6. By construction, both CO and c1 are made of no blocks of n, I F, symbols and must have been obtained through nonzero codewords cg and ci' of the outer code Co. By assumption, c: and cy intersect in at least one position j , thus block j of both CO and c1 are nonzero codewords of the inner code C,. By assumption, these blocks intersect and thus CO and c1 intersect as well.
II
The following constructions are based on a simple observation of [19] : if M defines an [n, k , d] code for some d > n/2 then it must intersect (by a pigeon-hole argument: any two codewords of such a code intersect). Unfortunately, for binary codes, Plotkin's bound [34] implies that [n, k , n/2 + 11 codes can only exist for n > 2 k , which would result in terribly wasteful zigzags. But for larger fields we can exploit this idea and then combine it with concatenation to build intersecting codes over Fa.
C. Las Vegas Construction
Although the result of Section IV-A implies that binary linear ( O ( k ) , k)-zigzags exist and can be obtained easily by picking one at random, it does not provide an efficient way of building a guaranteed zigzag. The problem of checking if a random matrix defines a zigzag seems rather hard: it is trivially solvable in exponential time but no polynomialtime algorithm for this problem is known. Nevertheless, using concatenation we can build from a random matrix defining a zigzag, new matrices exponentially larger with no extra effort to check if they also define a zigzag. Therefore, the exponential time necessary to check if a random matrix defines a zigzag becomes negligible with respect to the full size of the matrix. Kilian [32] inspired by the concatenation method of [19] has exploited this into a Las Vegas construction of intersecting codes that we now describe. Although this construction is limited to values of k of that precise form, a similar construction using an incomplete outer Reed-Solomon code yields a similar expansion factor for any value of k. Details of this generalization are left to the reader.
As observed by Cohen and Lempel in [8] , since the Reed-Solomon codes are minimum-distance-separable, it is impossible that similar codes with a smaller minimal distance intersect. Since the size of the random inner code is also optimal in the sense of the previous se n, we conclude that this technique cannot yield (2Ak, k)-zigzag for X < a.
Time Complexity: By the result of Section IV-A, m x y m matrices defining an intersecting code always exist and for sufficiently large m, at least half of these matrices have this property. Thus only a constant number of matrices must be tested on the average.
Checking whether or not a matrix M has the property requires to find all the codewords generated by M , which takes time in O(mam), and to check that each pair of codewords intersect, which takes time in O (~n 2 '~) .
The total average running time is, therefore, in O ( k 2 ) since k = m2"-'.
D. Deterministic Construction a la Goppa
An alternative to Reed-Solomon codes for getting outer codes with d > n / 2 , first put forward by Crtpeau and Santha [19] , is to use algebraic-geometric (AG) codes of Goppa [27] .
We rely on the work of Katsman, Tsfasman, and Vladuf [29] for their polynomial construction. [8] .
Time Complexity: This is the drawback of this approach:
current constructions of AG codes require O ( k 3 2 ) operations.
Thus although the construction is polynomial-time, it is quite impractical.
minimal distance at least N / 2 + 1.
code Co.
code C,.
E. Deterministic Construction a la Justesen
We now take a deterministic approach similar to the con- These codes are intersecting.
Construction: Let q = 2b for some b > 0 and a be such that h,(1/2) < a/(. + 1). Consider any m large enough that
Take N = mqm. code is found and use it as primary inner code C,.
Use any [n,, b, d,] intersecting binary code as secondary inner code C,.
intersecting code over I F, , while C = CO * C, is a binary a [30k, k , d ] binary intersecting code, for k = m4". As in Section IV-C, a construction using an incomplete outer Reed-Solomon code yields a similar expansion factor for any value of k . Details of this generalization are left to the reader.
Time Complexity: The first example above is the fastest deterministic construction known to the authors of a good family of intersecting codes and thus of a good zigzag family.
For k = 3m64", in the worst case only (64" -1)2 < (k/lg k ) 2 codes Ca, p will be tested for self-intersection.
Testing each such code requires comparing 642m pairs of codewords of length 3m. This requires O(k2/lg k ) operations. Therefore, the total running time is in O(k4/(lgk)3) in the worse case.
v. ONGOING RESEARCH AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We have shown how to construct linear-size zigzags both by probabilistic and deterministic polynomial-time methods. The exact complexity of the decision problem "Given a matrix M , is it the generator of a zigzag?" still has to be determined (the best we can say is that it is in CO-NP). Another open problem is to construct over F, some zigzag that will do better than the asymptotic bounds of Section IV-A. Finally, we ask if nonlinear functions can generate smaller zigzags than linear functions.
An important fact about the method based on zigzag functions considered in this paper is that, by definition of the zigzag, there is no way for B to learn information about both WO and wl even though the zigzag function is known before he gets to choose which bits to obtain through the (?)-OTz instances in Protocol 1.1 (unless a Monte Carlo zigzag family is used). We are currently investigating [SI another approach to the problem of reducing (9) -0Tk to (9) -OTz, in which A does not reveal the function to B until after the necessary (2) -0Tz's have been performed.
Our new approach is based on privacy ampl$cation, a technique invented in [4] and refined in [3] . Assume A knows a random n-bit string IC about which B has partial information. Privacy amplification allows A to shrink IC to a shorter string y about which B has an arbitrarily small amount of information even if he knows the recipe used by A to transform IC into y. Intuitively, this can be used to implement (~) -O T~( w o , w1)(c) from (9) 20 and some of the bits of 5 1 will not have enough information on at least one of them to infer any information on the corresponding w or even joint information on both wo and wl.
Privacy amplification allows for a protocol that is simpler, more general, and more efficient than the zigzag-based solution investigated in this paper, but at the cost of a vanishingly small failure probability. More specifically, 2k + s instances of (?)-OTz are sufficient to implement (?)-OTk so that the probability that a cheating 8 may learn information on both strings is exponentially small in s. This is significantly better than all the methods based on zigzag functions provided a probability of failure is tolerable. Moreover, it allows the implementation of (2) -0Tg at no extra cost if the underlying (f)-OTz goes in the other direction, i.e., from I 3 to A, or if it permits B to choose not only one bit or the other, but also their exclusive-or. A drawback of this approach is that a new function must be generated and transmitted at each run of the protocol. We postpone our detailed exposition of this alternative technique because our research is still ongoing [5] .
In particular, we wish to investigate the extent of its generality.
APPENDIX I PROOFS OF CORRECTNESS AND PRIVACY Both Protocols 1.1 and 1.2 were described for the specific set F = (0, l}. As a matter of fact, they would work equally well for any finite set F . Thus in the proofs we do not consider any particular F .
A. Protocol 1.1
We show that given that f is an (n, k)-zigzag, Protocol 1.1 is correct and private. We assume the existence of a correct and private subprotocol [a, VI for (:)-OTz.
Theorem AI: Protocol 1.1 is correct. Let us suppose that alM and blM do not intersect. Then we claim that in case of any of the above dependencies, the probability that a2M and b2M do not intersect either is at most (E)". The proper analysis is quite similar in the four cases, let us consider here in details, for example, the case when a2 = al. Let 1 5 i 5 n be an index. The string a4b; with probability 1/3 takes each of the values 00, 01, and 10.
Condition (4)
Since 4 = 1 with probability 1/2 independently from the value of sib;, we have If the random variables x,, and xS, are not independent, then we will bound cov (xS1, xsz) from above by EIXsl]EIXszIXs, = 11. If X s Z and X S , are independent, then cov ( X S , , X S , ) = 0. The proof works out because for most S1 and S2 they are indeed independent. We will prove this with the help of the following lemma:
This iS true independently for every i , and the claim followS. Therefore, the total contribution to the variance of these with respect to E[x12 is Case 2: rank(U) = 2. Then S1 = Sa, and the number of Lemma A l : Let M = (m!) be a random k x n binary matrix. If for some t > 0, { a1 , . . . , a t ) is a linearly independent family of vectors of length k , then alM, . . . , a,M are such families is ("L,'). In this case independent random variables.
Proof: Let us fix t binary vectors { bl , . . . , bt ) of length n. Let A be the t x k matrix whose ith row is a,, and similarly let B be the t x n matrix whose ith row is b,. We will show that Prob { A M = B } = 2-tn.
We can suppose without loss of generality that the first t columns of A have rank t. Let us choose anyhow e: E IF2 for i = t + 1, . . . , k and j = 1, . . . , n, and let us fix m: = c:.
Let A be the truncation of A to its first t columns, and let be the truncation of M to its first t rows. Finally, let 2 = ( b f ) be the t x n matrix where 
